ReadyNAS 6.1 volume encryption

fastfwd wrote:
But wouldn't that defeat the purpose of encryption?

Not necessarily. Your purpose might be to ensure that when a drive is replaced the data cannot be compromised.

If your purpose is to prevent data compromise if the unit is stolen, then leaving the USB key in all the time could also work. It depends on how Netgear set it up.

For instance, perhaps the data on the key is itself encrypted with public key encryption and that the ReadyNAS bios or OS6 decrypts that data to obtain the real decryption key for the volume. Since the key only works in a ReadyNAS, it could not be used to access your data in another system (PC, etc). The password/access controls on the shares and admin interface would protect your data from access if drives are in the ReadyNAS (even if the bad guy has the USB key). NOTE - this is a hypothetical. I don't know if Netgear used this kind of approach or not.

It would be helpful if Netgear gave more information on how the encryption is implemented. That would allow admins to do their own threat analysis, and in some cases, allow them to assess if the approach lets them meet regulatory requirements (such as HIPAA compliance in the US).